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Sonic Bust: Trying to Retain Major League 
Franchises in Challenging Financial Times 
 
PAUL M. ANDERSON 
National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School 
& 
W.S. MILLER 
University of Wisconsin-Parkside 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between a major league team and its market is rarely 
examined by more than reports in the local media about current games, the 
team’s win-loss record and future stars, along with occasional glances at 
television ratings and attendance figures.  While the aforementioned items can 
mean a great deal for fans and the media, the reality is that these elements are 
usually not determinative of a successful long-term relationship between a 
team and its home community. 
Instead, the more important elements of the relationship often run much 
deeper and involve political machinations, public funding, financial promises 
made by both sides, requests and commitments for upgrades and new 
facilities, and the ongoing struggle to protect the benefits owed to both of the 
parties involved.  These are the items that often determine whether the 
relationship delivers the promised and negotiated value for all involved 
parties. 
As a result, it is vitally important for both parties to have an explicit 
understanding of their goals and desires for their partnership. They each need 
to understand what the other is bringing to the table and what they are looking 
to get out of the deal. The document that ties all of these goals, desires and key 
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elements together in an attempt to protect the long-term economic interests of 
both parties is the lease agreement.1 
For the community, the lease agreement is the contractual representation 
of the team’s commitment to a facility and should protect the community’s 
ability to reap the benefits of what it has provided for the team.  For example, 
from 1990 - 2010 communities spent approximately $5.6 billion to build or 
renovate arenas for National Basketball Association (NBA) franchises.2  The 
average public investment in these facilities over this time has been 
approximately $110 million dollars in public support.3  In the current economy 
where public dollars for any project are scarce all over the country, these kinds 
of figures give pause to many who cannot understand why policy makers 
within these communities, and often the voting public, see some direct benefits 
associated with the presence of a major league team and are willing to pay for 
this presence.  At the same time, and often in exchange for this public 
subsidization, the community will ask the team to promise to stay for the 
foreseeable future.  This commitment to stay is important because it is the 
team’s presence both in the facility and in the overall market that drives the 
promised long-term economic benefits that the franchise promised and 
community is paying for. 
In today’s sports industry, it is more important than ever for communities 
to try to protect this promise to the greatest extent possible. Franchises from 
all four of the major professional sports leagues are seemingly exploring 
relocation possibilities from facilities that received significant public 
investments on a monthly basis. In addition, team bankruptcies and ongoing 
threats of league contraction as part of collective bargaining negotiations make 
it essential for communities to try to protect their financial interests to the 
highest level possible. Finally, all four major professional sports leagues are 
now playing exhibition and regular season games in facilities all around the 
world. This means even communities that “keep the home team at home” 
could see their number of staged events reduced in their facilities as their 
                                                 
1. Throughout this article the term lease agreement will be used to refer to the many documents 
that can be used by parties to govern the relationship between sports facility owners and franchises. 
For example, the Milwaukee Brewers’ lease agreement is made up of several different agreements 
including a Construction Administration Agreement, Shared Ownership Agreement, Ground Lease, 
Amended and Restated Non-Relocation Agreement, and a separate lease agreement. 
2. National Sports Law Institute (NSLI), Facility Update Charts: National Basketball 
Association: Appendix 2, SPORTS FACILITY REPORTS, Vol. 10, Summer 2009, 
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=3956. 
3. Id.  Since 1990, 23 of the 30 teams received a new or renovated facility. In addition, of these 
teams only two, the Boston Celtics in TD Banknorth Garden and the Toronto Raptors in the Air 
Canada Centre, did not receive any public funding. 
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heroes play on distant shores. These games theoretically reduce the negotiated 
for long-term economic benefits coming back to the community that financed 
the team’s home stadium or arena. 
On the team side, in order to remain competitive in any of the four major 
professional sports leagues, owners usually argue that they must play in a state 
of the art facility that will provide them with the highest revenue earning 
potential.  This usually requires the presence of a public subsidy for the 
stadium or arena. For example, 83% of the teams in the NBA have received 
some form of public support toward renovating or building an arena that they 
will call home.4  Without this public investment it is unlikely that many teams 
would locate in a particular city or would be able to afford to build their own 
facility in the location of their choice.  Instead, teams are willing to stay in 
cities often as a result of this public support, counting on the revenues they 
will receive from the facility they play in and making promises that they will 
not leave for a fixed period of time. 
This article will analyze the deal that is made between a community and a 
major league franchise in order to determine what approaches a community 
can utilize to best protect itself and the investment that it has made to entice 
the team to play in its community. The analysis will begin with an in-depth 
look at the circumstances surrounding the recent relocation of the Seattle 
SuperSonics to Oklahoma City and the subsequent litigation generated by that 
move.  This litigation is the most recent example illustrating what can happen 
when the relationship between a community and a major league sports team 
deteriorates and eventually breaks.  The article will then examine the new 
deals that developed surrounding the end of that litigation.  Building on this 
analysis, it will turn to a review of the potential power of a remedy often 
included within professional sports league lease agreements - specific 
performance.  Finding this remedy to be inadequate at best, the article will 
conclude by examining potential solutions that communities can negotiate for 
within the lease agreements that they strike with professional sports franchises. 
II. THE FACILITY AND THE DEAL IN SEATTLE 
From 1967 to 1994, the Seattle SuperSonics played their home games at 
the Seattle Center Coliseum.  In 1993, the Seattle City Council agreed to 
renovate the facility at a cost of approximately $74 million.5  As part of the 
negotiations connected with the renovations, the city entered in to the 
                                                 
4. Id. 
5. City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, LLC., Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 
Docket Number: No. 07-2-30997-7 SEA, 2007 WL 5262606, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2007). 
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Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement (the focus of the dispute) with team 
owner SSI Sports, Inc., on March 2, 1994.6  Key Bank paid $15 million for a 
fifteen-year naming rights deal to name the facility.7 
In 2001, Howard Schultz, chairman and CEO of Starbucks, and head of 
the Basketball Club of Seattle (BCOS), purchased the Sonics for 
approximately $250 million.8  This group owned the team for only five years 
before selling it for approximately $350 million to the Professional Basketball 
Club, LLC (PBC), an Oklahoma limited liability company lead by Clay 
Bennett.9 
The team’s initial commitment to playing in the Coliseum (now Key 
Arena) was laid out in several clauses within the lease agreement.  Initially, 
the recitals at the beginning of the agreement made clear that: 
WHEREAS, the City desires to construct a new, state of the art 
professional basketball playing facility in order to enhance the City 
but cannot do so without a long-term, principal user; and 
WHEREAS, in order to induce SSI to become the principal user of a 
new playing facility on a long-term basis in lieu of having the 
SuperSonics play in an alternative venue, and to maintain the 
SuperSonics NBA franchise in Seattle, the City will construct a new 
Seattle Center Coliseum to replace the Current Facility, and 
WHEREAS, the City and SSI desire to enter into an agreement 
specifying the terms and conditions under which SSI will use a new 
Seattle Center Coliseum and certain other facilities at Seattle Center 
on a long-term basis for the playing of professional basketball by the 
SuperSonics. . .10 
                                                 
6. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement between the City of Seattle and SSI Sports, Inc., 
March 2, 1994.  Again, although this document is not titled as the “lease,” it is what is typically called 
the “lease agreement” between the professional sports team and the community.  These “leases” are 
often titled “use agreement,” “license,” and “management agreement.”  Regardless of the specific 
name, all of these types of agreements will be referred to as the “lease” or “lease agreement” within 
the article. 
7. NSLI, Facility Update Charts: National Basketball Association: Appendix 2, SPORTS 
FACILITY REPORTS, Vol. 1, Number 1, Spring 2000, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-
bin/site.pl?2130&pageID=489#facility. 
8. NSLI, Facility Update Charts: National Basketball Association: Appendix 2, SPORTS 
FACILITY REPORTS, Vol. 3, Number 1, Spring 2002, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl? 
2130&pageID=473. 
9. NSLI, Facility Update Charts: National Basketball Association: Appendix 2, SPORTS 
FACILITY REPORTS, Vol. 7, Summer 2006, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130& 
pageID=2629. 
10. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 1. 
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This lease was supposed to keep the team in Seattle until 2010.11 
Within the purchase agreement between PBC and BCOS, PBC agreed that 
it would “use good faith best efforts to negotiate an arena lease, purchase, use 
or similar arrangement in the King, Pierce or Snohomish Counties of 
Washington as a venue for the Teams’ games, to be used as a successor venue 
to Key Arena.”12  The team set a deadline of one year to work on getting a deal 
for a new arena in place.13 
At the same time, the team signed an Instrument of Assumption. Within 
this document it agreed to “assume and perform all of the obligations of SSI, 
Inc. under” the lease agreement, and agreed to “assume [the Seattle owners] 
liabilities and obligations under the [lease] Agreement on the terms and 
conditions set forth therein.”14 In addition, PBC agreed to “assume, and hereby 
agrees to satisfy or perform (as applicable), all liabilities and 
obligations. . .under the” lease agreement.15 
                                                 
11. Id. at 6 (II. TERM: USE PERIOD). 
12. The City of Seattle’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Defendant’s Efforts to Obtain 
a “Successor Venue” to Key Arena, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. 07-1620 
MJP (W.D. Wash. May 27, 2008).  PBC eventually developed a referendum (submitted too late in the 
legislative session to be voted on), calling for $400 million in taxpayer support, with a $100 million 
contribution from the team.  Cities, Teams Struggling to Get Along, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Feb. 18, 2007, at 10C.  The city of Seattle did not support this proposal, setting PBC to look to 
relocate. 
13. Sonics: We’re Going to Oklahoma City, ASSOC. PRESS, Nov. 2, 2007. 
14. Instrument of Assumption, at 1 (Oct. 9, 2007).   
15. Id. at 2. 
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III. THE DEAL GONE WRONG16 
After failing to come up with an alternative venue, and believing that its 
relationship with the city of Seattle was irreparably harmed, PBC sought to get 
out of its agreement and to get out of Seattle.17  
1. Arbitration Demand 
Pursuant to Article XXV of the lease, on October 9, 2007, PBC initiated a 
demand for arbitration against the city of Seattle.18  Although well before the 
2010 expiration date of the lease, the team argued that “Key Arena is no 
longer an economically viable NBA venue.”19  The team also claimed that it 
had worked diligently to obtain a suitable venue in the Seattle area but had 
                                                 
16. The litigation between the city and the team was not the only litigation the team faced as a 
result of its decision to relocate. 
Season ticket holders who renewed tickets, and thereby joined an exclusive club for season ticket 
holders, sued PBC claiming that it breached their contracts and violated the Washington Consumer 
Protection Act.  The plaintiffs also wanted the court, through specific performance, to force the team 
to sell them tickets in Oklahoma City under the same contract.  The district court allowed the contract 
claims to proceed but would not force PBC to sell tickets in the new city and did not find that the 
plaintiffs suffered any injury under the consumer protection statute.  Brotherson v. Professional 
Basketball Club, 604 F.Supp.2d 1276 (W.D. Wash. 2009), motion for reconsideration denied, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97921 (W.D. Wash. 2009).  On February 12, 2010, Judge Richard Jones of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington preliminarily approved a class 
action settlement between PBC and the plaintiffs for $1.6 million.  Brotherson v. Professional 
Basketball Club, No. C07-1787, Doc. 200 (Feb. 12, 2010).   
In addition, former SuperSonics owner, BCOS, led by Howard Schultz, sued PBC claiming that 
PBC fraudulently induced BCOS into selling the team and promising to keep it in Seattle.  The 
Basketball Club of Seattle, LLC, & Canarsie Holdings, LLC, Complaint for Relief Arising Out of 
Fraud and Misrepresentation (Derivative Action) (W.D. Wash., April 22, 2008).  By August of 2008, 
Schultz and BCOS had withdrawn the lawsuit because “Seattle’s best chance for a professional 
basketball franchise is to end this litigation and allow the city, state Legislature and other parties to 
begin the necessary fence mending with the NBA.”  Greg Johns, Schultz Withdraws Lawsuit Seeking 
Sonics’ Return, POST-INTELLIGENCE (SEATTLE), Aug. 29, 2008, available at 
http://www.seattlepi.com/basketball/377089_schultz30.html. 
17. Much has been written about allegations that Clay Bennett and other members of the new 
ownership group planned to move to Oklahoma City from the time they purchased the team.  While 
much of this was discussed in different motions before the court, none of it was admitted to the 
factual record.  In addition, these types of allegations are relatively unimportant in this analysis of the 
legal relationship between a major league team and a community.  Regardless of any comments or the 
alleged intent of the parties, the lease agreement is the contract that a court will analyze to determine 
the rights of the parties involved.  A community must focus on developing the most favorable 
agreement to protect its rights and should not rest its protection on allegations and hearsay. 
18. Arbitration Demand by The Professional Basketball Club, LLC to the City of Seattle, Sept. 
19, 2007. 
19 Id. at 1. 
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been unsuccessful, claimed losses of some $17,000,000 in 2007, $55,000,000 
over the past five years, and claimed that it had “no alternative but to play the 
2007-2008 season in Key Arena, and satisfy all remaining obligations by 
paying the rent for the balance of the term of the Agreement.”20 
Within this Arbitration Demand, the team tried to focus the dispute on 
whether it would be appropriate for the franchise to be forced to play the final 
two seasons under the lease at Key Arena. Answering this in the negative, the 
team argued that Key Arena had not been an economically viable arena for 
professional basketball for a number of years because it “lacks the necessary 
physical infrastructure and amenities and is an economically obsolete venue 
for men’s professional basketball.”21  Specifically, the team argued that the 
arena was the smallest in the NBA at almost half the average size of other 
NBA facilities, it did not allow for enough premium seating opportunities, and 
it had limited points of sale opportunities and for a team store.22 
The team also argued that the city had repeatedly acknowledged that the 
team brought no economic benefits to the city, the public did not care if the 
team left, and the relationship between the team and city leaders had been 
irreconcilably broken.23  Specific to a claim of specific performance, and 
reflecting many of the arguments from past professional sports litigation in 
this area,24 the team argued that the lease agreement was not the “type of 
business relationship that can be meaningfully and effectively ‘forced’ and 
supervised on a going-forward basis.”25 As a result, the team asked the 
arbitrator to enter a declaratory judgment finding that specific performance 
was not an available remedy that the city could look to under the lease 
agreement. 
                                                 
20. Id. at 1 & 7.  Rent is provided within the lease agreement in Article VIII. SSI PAYMENTS 
TO THE CITY.  Under this provision, after the initial rental fee,  
The annual rent shall be increased each October 1st, beginning in 1996, to reflect the total 
percentage increase in the “West-A” Consumer Price Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers, All 
Items (1982-84 = 100), . . . provided, further, that in no such twelve-month period shall the amount 
of the annual rent, as adjusted, paid by SSI be less than $800,000. 
Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 19. 
21. Arbitration Demand, supra note 18, at 1. 
22. Id. at 6-7. 
23. Id. at 2. 
24. Infra section V(2). 
25. Id. 
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2. Complaint Against the Team 
The city immediately responded by filing a complaint for declaratory 
relief asking the court to hold PBC to the lease agreement.26  The complaint 
itself is worth a detailed analysis as it provides much of the history leading to 
the dispute, although admittedly from only the city’s perspective. According to 
the city, the renovations to Key Arena were made in order to “re-construct the 
old Seattle Coliseum into a new, state of the art professional basketball playing 
facility in exchange for a commitment from the Sonics to play professional 
basketball at the new facility on a ‘long-term’ basis.”27 Arguing that the new 
owners assumed the responsibilities and promises of the previous owners 
when they purchased the team, the city pointed to Article II of the lease 
agreement in order to show that the team promised to play its home games at 
Key Arena.28  Article II provides that the team will “schedule and ensure that 
the SuperSonics play all Home Games. . .exclusively in [Key Arena]. . .”29 
The city argued that the team’s arbitration demand was improper because 
disputes related to Article II are specifically excluded from resolution through 
arbitration.  The city pointed to Article XXV, which provides that all claims 
related to the lease agreement can be resolved through arbitration, with a few 
exceptions, including situations where “the claim, dispute, or matter in 
question relates to the provisions of Article II.”30  The city also argued that the 
team knew about all of the problems it complained about in its arbitration 
demand prior to purchasing the franchise and so it should not be able to use 
arbitration to get out of the agreement.31 The city intended to focus on Article 
II in order to bring the matter to court and avoid taking the dispute to 
arbitration.  Presumably, the city’s advisors assumed that a court sitting in 
Seattle would reach a more favorable result than an arbitrator who might 
merely review the lease agreement and not understand the value of the team to 
the city. 
The city also pointed to Article XXVII, subsection L, which provides for 
specific performance as a form of recovery under the lease.32  The city’s 
argument was that because of this provision, and the exception provided 
                                                 
26. City of Seattle, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 2007 WL 5262606. 
27. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
28. Id. 
29. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 6.  This type of provision is often 
known as a “home team” provision within a professional sports lease. 
30. Id. at 54. 
31. City of Seattle, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 2007 WL 5262606, at *2. 
32. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 59. 
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within Article XXV related to the team’s promise to play in Key Arena, the 
court should force the team to specifically perform its obligation to play in 
Key Arena for the remainder of the lease term. 
In response to the team’s argument that it attempted to find a suitable 
replacement venue, the city argued that the owners “failed to live up to their 
promises.”33  The city explained that the new owners rejected several financial 
packages it put together and that the team’s legislative efforts were improperly 
late and relied on too much public subsidization.34 
Disagreeing with the team, the city made clear in this initial complaint that 
it agreed with and supported those who advocate for the benefits of the 
presence of a professional sports team within a community.  The city argued 
that the 
presence of the Sonics in Seattle creates large financial benefits for the 
City and for local businesses, including. . .income generated from 
lease payments; ticket sales; concessions and novelty sales; spending 
at local restaurants and hotels. . .; parking; spending on advertising 
and merchanding; . . .taxes paid by the team; revenues associated with 
Sonics players living in the Seattle area; . . .revenues from media 
covering the team’s games. . .and numerous non-quantifiable 
benefits. . .including. . .enhanced economic growth and ancillary 
private sector development spurred by the operation of a professional 
sports facility; convenient entertainment options for local families; 
facilities for youth activities; charitable events sponsored by the team 
and by individual players; advertising opportunities for local 
businesses; increased inducements for businesses to locate in Seattle, 
and for existing businesses to remain; and enhanced community pride, 
self-image, exposure, reputation, and prestige.35 
                                                 
33. City of Seattle, Complaint for Declaratory Relief, 2007 WL 5262606, at *1. 
34. Id. at 2. 
35. Id. at 2-3.  Of particular note, within this litigation the team disagreed with these positive 
impacts.  The team argued that there will be  
no net economic loss if the Sonics leave Seattle. Entertainment dollars not spent on the Sonics will 
be spent on Seattle’s many other sports and entertainment options. Seattleites will not reduce their 
entertainment budget simply because the Sonics leave. As to the impact on the fabric of the 
community, the PBC will present a recent survey showing that a significant majority of Seattleites-
66 percent-say it makes no difference to them if the Sonics leave, and that only a relative handful 
of people-12 percent-say their life will be ‘much worse off.’ The overwhelming attitude is apathy. 
Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. C07-
1620 MJP, 2008 WL 2472910, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 16, 2008). 
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According to the city of Seattle, the public body that put together the 
package that allowed for public funding of the improvements to Key Arena, 
the team brought an incredible amount of tangible and intangible benefits to 
the city.  This realization was the foundation for the city’s fight to keep the 
team as it did not want to lose the benefits it had paid for.  Pointing to the 
potential loss of these benefits, the city asked the court for a declaratory 
judgment holding that the lease could be specifically enforced in order to keep 
the team from leaving Seattle, and that disputes related to Article II could not 
be resolved through arbitration.36 The further litigation surrounding this 
dispute would prove to be extensive and complicated. 
3. Arbitration or Litigation? 
After both parties attempted to initiate some sort of resolution to their 
dispute, the initial focus in court was whether their dispute should be resolved 
through arbitration or litigation.  The day after the city filed suit, the team 
moved to stay the lawsuit pending completion of arbitration.37 The team 
pointed to section D of the lease’s arbitration clause, which provides a 
limitation on judicial relief, “No proceedings based upon any claim arising out 
of or related to this Agreement shall be instituted in any court by any party 
hereto against any other party hereto.”38  The team did not specifically 
disagree that disputes related to the term of the agreement (Article II) were not 
subject to this requirement, instead it argued that the real issue was what 
should happen when one party, here the team, breached this provision and 
could be found to be in default of the lease agreement.39 Following the team’s 
reasoning, at the point when it no longer planned to play games in Key Arena, 
it would be in default of the lease, and the actual relief to be granted to the city 
should then be decided by the arbitrator. 
This perspective would then lead an arbitrator to focus on the team’s 
ability to come up with some sort of monetary solution to the dispute.  In 
effect, the team could simply breach the lease, plan to move, and then pay its 
way out of the lease agreement.  This also would make specific performance a 
mere option for review by the arbitrator.  Given the inconsistent and 
disfavored enforcement of specific performance provisions by courts in 
                                                 
36. Id. at 6. 
37. The Professional Basketball Club’s Motion to Stay, City of Seattle v. The Professional 
Basketball Club, No. 07-2-30997-7 SEA (Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 2007). 
38. Id. at 9, citing, Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 55. 
39. Id. at 10. 
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previous cases,40 it made sense for the team to believe that there was a strong 
possibility that the arbitrator would also call for damages instead of specific 
performance. 
A few days later the city moved for a stay of the arbitration proceeding.41  
From the city’s perspective, the “sole purpose of the Sonics’ Arbitration 
Demand [was] to avoid their express contractual duty under Article II to play 
all home games in Key Arena.”42  Elaborating on its argument that the 
promises made in Article II were not subject to arbitration, the city explained 
that the actual lease went through many drafts and although the lease is 
ambiguous in relation to which disputes must be arbitrated and which cannot 
be, the city argued that the “only reasonable interpretation. . .is that the 
specific, express exception to the arbitration provision for claims ‘relate[d] to’ 
Article II controls.”43  The city also made clear that from its perspective the 
dispute was not merely related to Article II and the team’s potential breach, 
instead it went “to the very heart of that Article.”44  As the city explained, 
“PBC’s interpretation. . .would render the most important provision of the 
Lease. . . meaningless: the City would have the right to have the Sonics play in 
Key Arena. . .but would have no means to enforce that right.”45 
In reviewing the dispute, the court focused on “whether Article II [term] 
or Article XXVI [default and other remedies] under the Lease controls the 
underlying dispute between the parties.”46  Finding that the dispute revolves 
around the term of the agreement, the court characterized PBC’s argument as a 
move “ ‘as errant as a typical Shaquille O’Neal free throw,’ ignoring the clear 
language found in Article II.”47  Therefore, the court found that the dispute 
really related to whether PBC would fulfill its obligations for the term of the 
lease agreement.48  The court also found that the clear language within the 
lease demonstrated that the parties “unequivocally excluded from arbitration 
                                                 
40. Infra section V(2). 
41. City of Seattle’s Cross-Motion for Stay of Arbitration and Opposition to the Professional 
Basketball Club’s Motion to Stay, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. 07-2-
30997-7 SEA (Sup. Ct. Oct. 2, 2007). 
42. Id. at 2. 
43. Id. at 8. 
44. Id. at 11. 
45. Id. at 12-13. 
46. Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay and Granting Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Stay of 
Arbitration, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. C07-1620RSM, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83139 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 29, 2007). 
47. Id. at *12. 
48. Id. at *13. 
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disputes relating to Article II.”49 Therefore, the court held that the dispute was 
not subject to arbitration and granted the city’s motion to stay the arbitration 
proceedings.50 
4. Initial Dealings With Oklahoma City 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans Hornets moved 
their base of operations and played in Oklahoma City for the 2005-2006 and 
2006-2007 seasons.  During these seasons, the team was ranked in the top 15 
in per game attendance and NBA Commissioner David Stern raved about the 
city’s support of the NBA.51 After the Hornets left, Oklahoma City residents 
overwhelmingly approved a one-cent sales tax extension to fund a $121 
million renovation of the Ford Center.52  Because the Seattle SuperSonics 
ownership group was made up of businessmen from Oklahoma City, they 
were very familiar with the fan support and renovated facility that was 
available.   
In early 2008, as the relationship between the team and the city of Seattle 
continued to deteriorate, the team most likely assumed that the litigation 
would be resolved in a way that would allow it to move.  This seems more 
likely, because before the case went to trial, PBC sent a letter to Oklahoma 
City mayor Mick Cornett putting forth the material terms and conditions under 
which the team would move.53  Although hoping to be able to move for the 
2008-2009 season, Bennett made clear that the timing was dependent on a 
“favorable judgment in the litigation, a settlement agreement with the City of 
Seattle or expiration of the Key Arena Lease.”54  This document shows PBC’s 
clear intent to leave Seattle regardless of the outcome of its dispute with the 
city.  If the court forced it to stay until the end of the lease term in 2010, the 
team would then move for the following season.   
Another specific demonstration of the team’s intent to relocate can be 
found in its November 2007 application for approval from the NBA of its 
relocation to Oklahoma City, an application filed a few weeks after the court 
                                                 
49. Id. at *19. 
50. Id. at *20. 
51. Darnell Mayberry, NBA Owners Meetings; League Owners Vote on Sonics’ Relocation 
Today, THE OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 18, 2008, at 1C. 
52. Id. 
53. Letter from Clay I. Bennett, Chairman, The Professional Basketball Club, to the Honorable 
Mick Cornett, Mayor, City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Mar. 14, 2008). 
54. Id. at 1. 
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stayed its demand for arbitration.55  In this initial letter, Bennett laid out the 
team’s expectations related to the lease and other agreements it would sign 
with the city.  The agreement would have an initial 15-year term with a team 
option for an additional five-year term.56  Interestingly, and perhaps reflecting 
the litigation the team was currently involved in, the letter did not address 
specific performance, arbitration or other remedies, instead it noted only that 
the lease “will provide for mutually acceptable remedies in the event of a 
default by any party.”57  In specific response to the alleged losses the team 
faced in Seattle, the team now expected that its lease would contain an 
“Economic Benchmark Termination Right.”  Under this provision, at the end 
of specific periods of time, the team would retain the right to terminate the 
agreement “if the average of Team ticket revenues for the preceding two years 
fall below 85% of a benchmark established. . ."58  In addition, Oklahoma City 
would be “responsible for all costs of design and construction” with respect to 
renovations of the Ford Center and a practice facility for the team.59  In the 
midst of its litigation with the city of Seattle this letter and the team’s 
application to the NBA made clear that its relationship with Seattle was 
coming to an end one way or another. 
5. The Litigation: The City’s Argument 
Regardless of PBC’s negotiations with Oklahoma City, the Seattle 
litigation continued.  Attempting to convince the court that the only 
satisfactory resolution to the dispute was through specific performance, the 
city made clear that it sought to enforce the lease “to obtain the benefits, 
economic and intangible, that it bargained for when deciding to pledge 
taxpayer dollars in a completely renovated basketball arena.  Those benefits 
are unique in nature and cannot be measured in monetary terms.”60  More 
specifically, as to tangible benefits, the City alleged that the team spent $30 
million annually in Seattle, that this spending created approximately 150 jobs, 
that the team brought in substantial game-related spending from outside the 
city, and that it made substantial contributions to charitable organizations 
                                                 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 2. 
57. Id. at 6. 
58. Id. at 6-7. 
59. Id. at 14. 
60. City of Seattle’s Trial Brief, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. 07-1620 
MJP, at 2 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2008). 
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within the city.61  As to intangible benefits, the city argued that the team 
“create[d] civic pride, a sense of community, greater visibility to the country 
and world, and attract[ed] new businesses and residents.”62 
By specifically addressing these benefits the city bolstered its claim in two 
ways.  Initially, it showed that it would suffer significant harm if the Sonics 
were allowed to relocate.  In addition, by including intangible non-economic 
benefits it showed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a court to 
calculate a specific amount of damages that could compensate the city for 
these losses. 
As to its claim for specific performance, the city initially argued that the 
parties agreed to this form of recovery within the lease and that specific 
performance is warranted where the subject matter of the contract involved is 
unique.63  In addition, rehashing many of the sports franchise cases discussed 
later in this article, the city argued that because money damages would be 
inadequate to repay it for the broad economic and intangible benefits it would 
lose without the Sonics presence, specific performance was even more 
appropriate.64 
6. The Litigation: The Team’s Argument 
The team’s brief focused on the alleged losses it would face by being 
forced to stay in Seattle.  The team argued that it was economically crippled 
by the limitations associated with Key Arena, because the arena was “no 
longer economically viable for men’s professional basketball.”65  Specifically, 
of all arenas in the NBA, Key Arena was the smallest, limiting point of sale 
opportunities for food, beverages, and merchandise.66  As a result, the team 
alleged that it lost approximately $30 million for the 2007-2008 season and 
speculated that it would lose between $60 and $65 million more if it was 
forced to stay for the final two years of the lease agreement.67 
In answer to the city’s claim that specific performance was warranted as a 
remedy because monetary damages could not be properly calculated, the team 
argued that the amounts owed under the final two years of the lease could 
                                                 
61. Id. at 4. 
62. Id. at 5. 
63. Id. at 6 & 8. 
64. Id. at 11-13. 
65. Defendant’s Trial Brief (Redacted Version), City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball 
Club, No. 07-1620 MJP, at 4 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2008). 
66. Id. at 5 
67. Id.  
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easily be calculated.  These amounts would include fixed rental payments 
from the team, and a second rental amount related to suite rentals, suite leases, 
club seat sales, and a five percent admission tax.68  The team calculated these 
amounts as between $4.5 and $5 million for each remaining lease year.69 
In addition, while the city argued that there were many positive tangible 
economic and intangible benefits associated with the presence of the team in 
Seattle, the team argued that its departure would “not have any impact on 
Seattle’s economy.”70  The team pointed to the city’s own experts and pre-
litigation analysis that also agreed that “the Sonics have a limited economic 
impact on Seattle.”71 
Although not specifically addressed by the city, the team also addressed 
previous courts’ reluctance to allow specific performance when such a remedy 
would call for ongoing supervision.  As the team bluntly stated, “[t]he dispute 
has been ugly, and will require that people who no longer wish to associate 
with each other continue to do so.”72 
IV. THE NEW DEALS 
The case was set to be tried on June 16, 2008.73  At this point it became 
clear to many observers that even if the court enforced the specific 
performance provision, the relationship between the team and city, and 
between the team and community, had deteriorated to such a degree that 
keeping the team in Seattle would potentially benefit no one. 
1. The Settlement 
On July 2, 2008, the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement to be 
completed by August 1, 2008.74  Under the agreement, the team agreed to pay 
the city $45 million and in return the city agreed that the lease agreement 
would be terminated.75  Once the settlement was executed, the team was 
                                                 
68. Id. at 6. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at  9. 
71. Id. at 10. 
72. Id. at 16.   
73. Pretrial Order, City of Seattle v. The Professional Basketball Club, No. 07-1620 MJP, at 52 
(W.D. Wash. June 13, 2008). 
74. The Professional Basketball Club, LLC and City of Seattle Settlement Agreement 
Memorandum of Understanding (July 2, 2008) [hereinafter “Settlement Agreement”]. 
75. The city passed Ordinance 122736 on July 14, 2008, terminating the agreement.  Ordinance 
122736, Termination of the Agreement in accordance with the Professional Basketball Club, LLC and 
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allowed to relocate immediately to Oklahoma City to start the 2008-2009 
season. 
Of particular value to the city, after five years, PBC agreed to pay another 
$30 million unless, (1) the litigation between the parties was resolved forcing 
the team to play the remaining two seasons under the lease, (2) the state of 
Washington had not enacted legislation that provided sufficient funding to 
complete the public sector component of the Key Arena renovation, or, (3) a 
new NBA franchise had agreed to relocate to Seattle.76 
In addition, similar to what transpired when the original Cleveland 
Browns franchise relocated to Baltimore and left behind the Browns name for 
an expansion franchise, PBC agreed to leave behind all intellectual property 
associated with the Seattle Supersonics and agreed to transfer these rights to 
any new owner of a Seattle franchise.77 It is interesting to note that in light of 
the dispute over whether arbitration or judicial proceedings should have been 
undertaken to resolve the dispute between the city and team, the settlement 
agreement provided that all disputes related to it would be “subject to binding 
arbitration.”78 
2. The Oklahoma City Deal 
In March of 2008, the city of Oklahoma City authorized the extension of a 
one-cent sales tax that was used to raise $89 million for the renovation of the 
Ford Center, in an effort to attract an NBA team.79  The focus of this 
investment was to “stimulate the development, growth, and expansion of 
business within the downtown Oklahoma City area and promote tourism. . .”80 
Preparing for the team’s seemingly inevitable relocation from Seattle to 
Oklahoma City, in April of 2008, PBC and the city of Oklahoma City 
completed a lease agreement between the parties.81  The initial term of the 
agreement was set at fifteen years, with the team given the option to extend the 
term five times for a period of three years each.82  In addition, Article XX 
                                                                                                                     
City of Seattle Settlement Agreement Memorandum of Understanding, and repealing Ordinance No. 
122492 (July 14, 2008). 
76. Settlement Agreement, supra note 74, at 2. 
77. Id. at 3.  
78. Id. at 4. 
79. Arena Use License Agreement among the City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma City Public 
Property Authority, SMG, and The Professional Basketball Club, LLC, at 1, Apr. 15, 2008; NSLI, 
supra note 2. 
80. Arena Use License Agreement, supra note 79, at 1. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. Article II: Grant of License; Term; Use of Licensed Premises, §§2.32 & 2.33, at 22-23. 
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includes a “Covenant to Play” that provides that “the Team hereby covenants 
and agrees to play, all of its Home Games in the Arena commencing upon the 
Commencement Date and continuing throughout the License Term.”83 In 
addition, the agreement contains an “Economic Viability” clause wherein the 
team is given a limited right to terminate the agreement during its sixth, ninth 
and twelfth years if certain economic benchmarks are not reached.84  Given its 
alleged losses while in Seattle, PBC presumably wanted Oklahoma City to 
provide it with a way to get out of the lease if those types of losses were 
repeated. 
3. There Are No Winners Here 
Although the litigation was settled it is unclear whether either party 
actually finds itself better off now than it was before the dispute began.  It 
seems clear that PBC hoped to leave Seattle for Oklahoma City, and the team 
is now there in a renovated facility with a lease agreement that it believes will 
lead to higher revenue levels.  However, the team paid Seattle $45 million and 
could have been liable for another $30 million if the State of Washington had 
committed to funding a new or renovated arena in Seattle.85  For a team that 
claimed to have lost so much money in the Emerald City in such a short 
amount of time, it is hard to believe that the benefits it has received from 
moving outweigh the costs of the litigation and settlement at this point. 
The city of Seattle did receive payments from the team as a result of the 
Settlement.  However, it lost all of the benefits that it argued for as the reason 
behind the renovation of Key Arena in the first place.  In addition, its claim 
asking the court to invoke the specific performance provision within its lease 
agreement was never resolved making it unclear whether it would have been 
able to hold the team to its leasehold promises in this way. 
V. THE BACKGROUND: SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE IN SPORTS 
FACILITY LEASES 
The focus of the Seattle litigation was the stand alone “miscellaneous” 
lease provision found in the Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement that 
provides, “Enforcement of this Agreement: The obligations of the parties to 
this Agreement are unique in nature; this Agreement may be specifically 
                                                 
83. Id. at 63. 
84. Id. §20.4, at 66. 
85. Settlement Agreement, supra note 74, at 2. See also, Mike Baldwin, Bennett, Partners Save 
$30 Million, THE OKLAHOMAN, Jan. 2, 2010, at 6B. 
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enforced by either party.”86  An interesting item to note is that many NBA 
lease agreements have similar provisions.87  For example, the Phoenix Suns 
lease agreement for US Airways Center provides that “The Team shall play all 
of its Home Games at the Arena during the License Term,”88 while the Miami 
Heat’s lease for American Airlines Arena provides that “the Team shall play 
all of its Home Games at the Arena during the License Term.”89  These 
provisions are common as communities continue to believe that a home team 
clause will protect it when a team attempts to leave by at least providing a 
contractual remedy that a court can point to when enjoining a team from 
moving. 
It seems almost self-evident that a community negotiating a lease with a 
major league team will demand that the team warrant that all of its home 
games be played in the arena envisioned within the agreement.  When the 
community has also spent considerable tax dollars (i.e. Seattle paid almost $74 
million to renovate Key Arena for the team), this type of commitment seems 
both reasonable and logical. 
The city of Seattle attempted to tie this provision to Article II of the 
agreement, which provides that the team would “schedule and ensure that the 
SuperSonics play all Home Games. . . exclusively in the Coliseum.”90 The city 
pointed to this provision and asked the court to enforce it and enjoin the team 
from moving to Oklahoma City.  Before the court ruled on the application of 
this provision, the parties settled their dispute. 
Many professional sports team leases also contain specific performance 
provisions.  However, unlike the clause found in the Seattle SuperSonics lease 
agreement,91 these provisions are typically included within a default provision 
that provides what will occur if the parties to the agreement fail to honor the 
promises they have made. 
For example, the default provision within the Phoenix Suns lease provides 
that if the team fails to pay any fees due under the lease agreement, or fails to 
“observe or perform any of the other provisions” found in the lease,92 
                                                 
86. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 59. 
87. City of Seattle’s Trial Brief, No. 07-1620 MJP, at 3 n.1. 
88. Downtown Multipurpose Arena First Restated Suns License Agreement, by and between 
Phoenix Arena Development Limited Partnership, “Operator,” and Phoenix Suns Limited Partnership, 
“Team,” July 19, 1989, at 5. 
89. Miami Heat License Agreement dated as of April 29, 1997, among Metropolitan Dade 
County, Miami Heat Limited Partnership and Basketball Properties, Ltd., at 10. 
90. Id. at 6. 
91. Premises Use & Occupancy Agreement, supra note 6, at 59. 
92. Downtown Multipurpose Arena First Restated Suns License Agreement, supra note 88, at 31. 
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including the commitment to play their home games at US Airways Center, 
the operator may “[e]xercise  such rights and remedies as are provided by law 
or equity, or at any time. . . (i) recover all damages provided by law or equity; 
or (ii) exercise any other right or remedy at law or in equity including, without 
limitation, obtaining an injunction and specific performance.”93 
This provision is more clear and expansive than the Seattle lease with its 
repetition of “remedies provided by law or equity” and is repeated in the 
recovery provided to the team in the case of the operator’s default.94  A court 
analyzing this provision would likely have an easier time finding that specific 
performance was envisioned as a clear remedy available to the city. 
The Suns’ lease also contains a dispute resolution provision that provides 
that “[i]n the event of any default, breach or other dispute between the parties 
in connection with this License. . .” the parties shall undergo an extensive 
dispute resolution process, involving mediation or facilitation.95  Although the 
Suns’ lease agreement is similar to the Seattle agreement in that it provides for 
specific performance and an alternative dispute resolution process, it also 
provides for recourse to the judiciary to solve disputes.  Avoiding the 
confusion found in the Seattle lease, this dispute resolution provision provides 
that the parties can seek interim relief and may “initiate the appropriate 
litigation to obtain such relief.”96  Seemingly under this agreement, the 
argument provided by PBC claiming that the dispute over its breach of the 
commitment to play home games in Key Arena could have been brought 
directly to a court for an interim judgment. 
The Minnesota Timberwolves’ lease agreement for the Target Center 
contains a similar specific performance provision, again within an overall 
default provision.  Section 18.04 of the lease provides that 
Specific Performance.  The [Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball 
Limited] Partnership acknowledges that the Team, as property, is 
extraordinary and unique, and that under the organization of major 
league professional basketball by and through the NBA, Ogden cannot 
replace the Team as a user of the Arena and that the determination of 
damages caused by a breach of Section 2.01(d) hereof is uncertain, 
speculative and not possible of accurate ascertainment.  Therefore, the 
Partnership agrees that there exists no adequate and complete remedy 
at law to enforce such provisions and that equitable relief by way of 
                                                 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 33. 
95. Id. at 34-35.   
96. Id. at 36. 
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injunction or specific performance is an appropriate remedy for the 
enforcement of such covenants, notwithstanding and without regard to 
the provisions for liquidated damages. . .97 
This provision is specifically tied to the team’s commitment to “play all 
Games at the Arena during the Term of this Agreement.”98  The Timberwolves 
agreement does not provide for any form of alternative dispute resolution, 
instead it provides that in the event of a default by one party, the other party 
“may pursue any available remedy against the party in default, including a 
suit, action or proceeding at law or in equity. . .”99 
Although many professional sports team leases include specific 
performance provisions, most of these provisions can be found as specific 
remedies available when a party breaches its agreement and defaults on the 
lease.  Most of these provisions also are connected directly to a dispute 
resolution process or judicial remedies discussed in the lease agreement. 
In order to understand whether the faith in this remedy is warranted, the 
analysis will now shift to an exploration of the remedy of specific performance 
within these types of agreements, and cases within professional sports wherein 
courts have analyzed similar lease provisions and remedies. 
1. Specific Performance in General 
In most contracts, specific performance refers to “the ability of one party 
to force another party to an agreement to fulfill its obligations under the 
agreement the exact way that is required under the specific terms of the 
agreement.”100  Often, the party that has not breached the agreement will seek 
to have the other party specifically perform its obligations when it believes 
that some sort of damages, in the form of payments of rent or other economic 
losses, would be insufficient to make them whole and would not provide them 
with the full benefits that they bargained for within the agreement. 
As the sports cases discussed below make clear, courts are often reluctant 
to award specific performance in certain situations.  Initially, in situations 
where there is a difficulty of supervision, a court may be reluctant to force this 
type of solution.  This was one of the arguments made by PBC in the Seattle 
litigation.  This reluctance is reflected in the Restatement (Second) of 
                                                 
97. Arena Use Agreement between Ogden Entertainment Services, Inc. and Minnesota 
Timberwolves Basketball Limited Partnership, dated as of Mar. 17, 1995, at 48. 
98. Id. at 11, §2.01(d). 
99. Id. at 47-48. 
100. WILLIAM MILLER & PAUL ANDERSON, MAJOR LEAGUE LEASES: AN OVERVIEW OF MAJOR 
LEAGUE FACILITY LEASES AND HOW THEY ARE NEGOTIATED 355 (2001). 
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Contracts, which states “[a] promise will not be specifically enforced if the 
character and magnitude of the performance would impose on the court 
burdens in enforcement or supervision that are disproportionate to the 
advantages to be gained from enforcement and to the harm to be suffered from 
its denial.”101 In these situations where a court may be asked to watch over the 
“performance of specialized contracts involving technical knowledge or 
expertise”102 it may be reluctant to expand its role into supervising a 
relationship that it is not well versed in.  However, this particular problem may 
not come in to play in the sports franchise context when specific performance 
relates to playing games in a facility as originally agreed to under a lease 
agreement.  It would be apparent to anyone whether the team was actually 
performing this obligation if forced to do so by a court. 
An additional concern occurs when courts find that the contract in dispute 
“is unusually complex and extensive supervision would be required to assure 
completion of all of its terms.”103  Although sports franchise lease agreements 
are incredibly complex, often running into the hundreds of pages and 
including many interrelated agreements that all must be analyzed to truly 
understand the overall lease arrangement, a home team provision similar to 
that found in the Seattle, Phoenix or Miami leases, dealing merely with the 
team playing home games in a specific location, would not likely rise to this 
level of complexity. 
An argument that may bear more weight in the sports context is when a 
court finds that an award of specific performance is less efficient than a 
normal damage remedy.104  Following this argument, if the contract involved 
allows for specific damages related to a breach, a court may merely hold the 
breaching party liable for these monetary damages, and may be unwilling to 
impose a specific performance remedy as well.  This particular argument is the 
one that most sport teams focus on in their attempts to defeat specific 
performance claims, and was the specific rationale for PBC’s calculation of 
the amounts that it would owe if it breached the Seattle lease. 
Even though courts are reluctant to award specific performance in many 
situations, in two general situations such an award will be warranted.  Initially, 
in situations where there is an “inability to accurately assess the monetary 
value of the promisor’s performance” a court may award specific performance 
                                                 
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §366. 
102. Will Hendrick, Pay or Play?: On Specific Performance and Sports Franchise Leases, 87 
N.C. L. REV. 504, 508 (2008-2009). 
103. Id. 
104. Hendrick, supra note 102, at 509. 
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because this calculation “is a logical prerequisite to awarding damages.”105 If 
this inability is coupled with a situation where damages would not be a proper 
substitute for performance under the contract,106 specific performance may be 
awarded because damages would be “inadequate to compensate the public (as 
landlord) for the true loss of its bargain which would result if the club (as 
tenant) failed to occupy the facility. . .for the agreed duration of its lease.”107 
Both of these claims would be made by most cities seeking to have a team 
forced to specifically perform under the lease agreement involved.  Initially, 
similar to the city of Seattle’s arguments, any city would argue that it would be 
impossible to properly calculate the value of its losses if the team were let out 
of an unexpired lease agreement.  It would also argue that even if some 
calculation were possible, any award of damages would not be able to properly 
substitute for what it would actually lose.  In essence, even if a city can receive 
some sort of monetary penalty for the team’s breach, the only real relief it will 
ever want is for the team to continue playing in the facility covered by the 
lease agreement. 
Of course, a true analysis of the inadequacy of monetary damages as a 
remedy for the breach of a professional sports lease agreement often leads to a 
discussion of the potential economic benefits associated with the presence of a 
sports franchise within a community.  Unfortunately, the debate in this area is 
unresolved.  Many communities, teams, and business professionals advocate 
for the benefits, both tangible and intangible, associated with the presence of a 
team within a community.108  On the other side, many academics argue that 
there is no benefit, that any potential benefit is negligible, or that in fact the 
costs associated to a city associated with public support for a sports facility, 
and in some sense then - support for the team, outweigh any potential 
benefits.109  However, there is no clear winner here. 
In the end, the stadium debate becomes a battle between those 
opposed to any form of taxation in support of the sports industry, and 
                                                 
105. Id. at 510. 
106. Id. 
107. Bruce Burton & Matthew Mitten, New Remedies for Breach of Sports Facility Use 
Agreements: Time for Marketplace Realism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 809, 816 (2003). 
108. Michael Mondello & Paul Anderson, Stadiums, Arenas, and Sports Referendums: A 
Comparative Analysis of Cities Involved in the Stadium Game, 5 INT’L J. SPORT MAN. 43, 55-57 
(2004). 
109. Id. at 51-55.  For an interesting analysis of both sides of this argument see MARK 
ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND WHO’S PAYING FOR IT 
(1999), and MARK ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE WINNERS: USING SPORTS AND CULTURAL 
CENTERS AS TOOLS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2010). 
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those interested in supporting the industry even if it means using 
public subsidies.  For every analysis that demonstrates there are no 
positive economic effects associated with stadium construction, there 
are similar studies on the opposite side demonstrating there are 
substantial economic and non-economic benefits.  The result is that 
the decision to provide public funding for a stadium or arena is really 
part of the normal political process of a community.  It is that 
community’s decision, often represented in a referendum, that will 
dictate what the community perceives as the positives and negatives 
associated with the proposed professional sports facility.110 
In Seattle there was no confusion in relation to this issue.  The community 
made clear that it wanted the team to stay because of the benefits it associated 
with the team’s presence in the community as it sought to “enforce its 
contractual rights and to obtain the benefits, economic and intangible, that it 
bargained for when deciding to pledge taxpayer dollars in a completely 
renovated basketball arena.”111  Communities must believe in these types of 
benefits if they intend to argue for specific performance as a court may be 
more likely to consider this type of remedy when it is unable to calculate some 
other form of monetary damages. 
Beyond these general principles, there have been several interesting cases 
that have analyzed specific performance claims brought by teams in 
professional sports. 
2. Specific Performance Litigation in Professional Sports Leases  
Although the decisions have not been uniform, the professional sports 
cases discussed below lay a foundation for analyzing an argument made by a 
community asking a court to force the team to specifically perform its 
obligations under its lease agreement.112 
                                                 
110. Mondello & Anderson, supra note 108, at 57. 
111. City of Seattle’s Trial Brief, No. 07-1620 MJP, at 2. 
112. In addition to the cases discussed here, some other cases have discussed specific 
performance as a subsidiary consideration within bankruptcy proceedings. 
The city of Glendale built a new arena for Phoenix Coyotes in 2003.  In order to protect the city’s 
investment, the lease agreement required that the team would play all of its home games in the arena 
and that the city would have the right of specific performance within the lease to enforce this 
requirement.  By 2008, the then-owners of the Coyotes were in serious financial trouble and began to 
search for potential buyers.  Although the court discussed the specific performance provision a bit, at 
this stage of the litigation it did not decide whether the lease agreement and this particular obligation 
would survive the bankruptcy claim.  In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30 (U.S. Bank. Ct. 
2009). 
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 A. New York Jets (1977) 
One of the earliest cases where a court forced a team to live up to its 
bargain within a lease agreement did not even specifically address the remedy 
of specific performance.  However, the case is instructive in providing the 
reasoning as to why a court would force a team to live up to its lease 
obligations. 
In 1977, the New York Jets attempted to schedule some early season home 
games outside of Shea Stadium due to perceived conflicts with the New York 
Mets schedule.  The Mets were given priority rights to schedule their games at 
Shea for designated times.  The City of New York sued the Jets asking the 
court to stop them from playing games away from Shea due to a provision 
within the lease agreement requiring that the team play all of its home games 
in the stadium after September 1st of any given year.113  Siding with the city, 
the court discussed the potential harm that the city would face if the Jets 
played two games at a different facility in great detail: 
The City was not authorized to construct the stadium for the lease 
money consideration. The City, as a corporate body, has not, will not, 
or was it intended to make a profit from stadium rental. It is the City 
as a community, ‘the people of the City’ to quote the statute (L 1961, 
ch 729, § 1), who are here threatened with irreparable injury. The 
purpose of the construction and the leases, and the requirement that 
home games, both baseball and football, be played at Shea, are 
inextricably entwined with the vital public interest as quoted above 
from the enabling legislation. Every home game not played at Shea 
causes more than a loss of rental. That is only money. It results in 
injury to the welfare, recreation, prestige, prosperity and trade and 
commerce of the people of the City. 
The Jets argue that ‘It’s only two games. No big deal.’ Every business 
that leaves the City; every major corporate home office that departs 
for the suburbs; every drop in the number of people employed 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; every downward thrust in 
the City’s credit standing; each team that leaves for a greener (larger) 
                                                                                                                     
In a similar bankruptcy case, the owners of the Pittsburgh Penguins were enjoined from initiating 
any discussions concerning the sale or relocation of the team in violation of their lease agreement.  In 
re: Pittsburgh Sports Associates Holding Company, et. al., 199 Bankr. LEXIS 1870 (W.D. Penn. 
1999).  Although specific performance was mentioned within the lease agreement, it was not the 
focus of the court’s discussion as the team pointed to a general non-relocation clause instead.  
113. City of New York v. New York Jets Football Club, Inc., 394 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803 (Supr. Ct. 
NY 1977). 
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stadium is another drop of the City’s life blood. Every reduction in the 
number of home games seriously adds to the cumulative effect upon 
the City’s viability. Two games may sound small but they are an 
important part of the home game schedule. Such injuries are not 
measurable in money damages nor could money repair the harm. . . 
The threat of irreparable injury has not merely been shown, it is self-
evident.114 
In showing the harm that the city would face by losing the team, albeit for 
only two games in one season, the court provided perhaps the most detailed 
analysis of the value of a team to a city. 
The court then upheld a motion for an injunction preventing the team from 
playing outside of Shea Stadium, and as a result invalidated the entire NFL 
schedule.  The court made clear that a party to a lease agreement may not have 
to perform its obligations if performance is impossible, however, if that 
impossibility is really due to the party’s own conduct performance will not be 
excused.115  In other words, because the Jets ignored their obligations under 
the lease agreement, they could be forced to specifically perform by changing 
their schedule, and impacting the entire NFL schedule, in order to come into 
compliance with their obligations under the lease. 
 B. New Orleans Jazz (1979) 
In 1979 the NBA’s Jazz franchise moved from New Orleans to Utah.  As a 
result of the move, the corporate manager of the Superdome (where the team 
played), the state of Louisiana, and the Stadium District, sued the franchise 
seeking specific performance of the terms of the lease agreement involved.116  
Although the litigation did not focus solely on the specific performance issue, 
the appellate court’s reasoning pointed to the difficulty in analyzing this type 
of award under a professional sports lease agreement. 
The plaintiffs argued that because the team had moved (the Jazz had 
already moved to Utah at the time of the litigation) it had refused to play its 
games in the Superdome as required under the lease agreement.  The plaintiff 
sought “specific performance under the terms of the lease requiring the Jazz to 
play in the Superdome. . .”117  However, the court recognized the problems 
associated with this type of remedy, noting “the chaos that would result should 
                                                 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 805. 
116. HMC Management Corp. v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So.2d 700 (Ct. App. La. 
1979). 
117. Id. at 703. 
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this court seek by specific performance or injunctive relief the requirement 
that the Jazz play its games in the Superdome, inasmuch as such an order must 
consistently require some other member team be made to appear and play that 
game.”118 
Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that the “Jazz impliedly contracted with 
the City to remain in New Orleans for as long as the franchise continues to 
exist and as long as the Club plays professional basketball in the NBA.”119  
The court disagreed, finding that the plaintiff’s expansive theory would “grant 
legal authority to the City to file suit against any tourist-based industry for 
relocation.”120  Perhaps as appropriate in 1979 as it is now, the court went on 
to note that “[i]n today’s uncertain times, the right of free enterprise and 
freedom of the marketplace, and the freedom and mobility of interstate 
commerce outweigh the City’s speculative quasi-contract rights to those types 
of businesses.”121 
In the end, the appellate court agreed with the trial court decision that 
specific performance was not an available remedy under the lease because 
courts generally do not allow for this type of relief “to enforce contracts of 
lease.”122 
 C. New York Yankees (1983) 
Over the years, the old Yankee Stadium was renovated many times. In 
1982, as renovations were being completed yet again, the Yankees asked for 
assurances from the city that the renovations would be completed by the start 
of the 1983 season.  Not receiving the assurances they wanted, the team told 
the city that its home opening series in April of 1983 against the Detroit Tigers 
would be played in Denver.123  The City sued to enjoin the Yankees from 
playing in Denver, pointing to the lease agreement requirement that the team 
was required to play all home games in Yankee Stadium until 2002.124 
Granting the injunction, the court recognized the irreparable harm the city 
would face, in this case if the Yankees played in another stadium for only 
three games, 
                                                 
118. Id. at 706. 
119. Id. at 708. 
120. Id. at 709. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. at 711. 
123. City of New York v. New York Yankees, 458 N.Y.S.2d 486, 487-488 (Supr. Ct. NY 1983). 
124. Id. at 488. 
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The Yankee pinstripes belong to New York like Central Park, like the 
Statue of Liberty, like the Metropolitan Museum of Art, like the 
Metropolitan Opera, like the Stock Exchange, like the lights of 
Broadway, etc. Collectively they are ‘The Big Apple.’ Any loss 
represents a diminution of the quality of life here, a blow to the city’s 
standing at the top, however narcissistic that perception may be. 
‘Big deal’ argue the Yankees. We open in Seattle anyhow on April 5. 
We will have a New York opening with all the traditional hoopla on 
April 15. And it’s only three games we are talking about which is 
proportionately a much smaller percentage of the season than the two 
games in the Jets case. However it is the symbolism of the act not the 
quantity which counts. Any reduction in the number of home games, 
especially if it involves the home opening games eagerly awaited by 
the real fans after a long winter in the hot stove league, erodes the ties 
of loyalty between the people of the city and their team. Dare one 
whisper the dreaded words: ‘The Denver Yankees.’ 
No money damages can measure or assuage this kind of harm.125 
 D. California Angels (1994) 
In 1978 the city of Anaheim entered into an agreement with a 
development company owned by Los Angeles Rams owner Carroll 
Rosenbloom for extensive commercial development on the stadium parking lot 
at Anaheim Stadium.  The Angels sued to enjoin the project from moving 
forward, claiming that it violated their lease agreement, which called for their 
use of the parking lot and the stadium for home games.  The trial court agreed 
with the team and granted specific performance and injunctive relief 
preventing the development from moving forward.126  All of the parties 
appealed. 
In a lengthy decision focused on the true nature of the agreement between 
the parties, the appellate court noted that the agreement between the city and 
team was the type that could be subject to specific performance, however, it 
would not uphold the trial court’s decision.127  The appellate court found that 
although it had the power to enforce a remedy of specific performance under 
the agreement, such a remedy “is a remedy for breach of contract,” and here, 
the city did not breach its contract with the team. The team was still given 
                                                 
125. Id. at 490. 
126. Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 25 Cal.App.4th 11 (Ct. App. Cal. 1994) 
127. Id. at 33. 
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access to the required minimum number of parking spaces and although there 
was some dispute as to where and how these spaces should be provided, this 
did not amount to a breach of the agreement by the city.  Therefore, because it 
had not breached the agreement, there were no obligations that the city was 
not upholding. 
 E. Florida Panthers (1996) 
The Florida Panthers began playing in the Miami Arena in 1993.  Under 
the lease agreement with the Miami Sports & Exhibition Authority, the team 
had to exercise an option to renew its lease for the 1996-1997 season by 
August 1, 1995.  Due to “extremely unfavorable economic terms” the team 
decided not to renew its option.128  Behind the scenes, the team seemed to be 
comparing its agreement to the terms found within the Miami Heat’s 
agreement and felt that their deal was worse than the Heat’s deal.  However, 
the team also made clear that “if the economic terms of a new License 
Agreement. . .could be obtained which were comparable to those economic 
terms presently granted to the Miami Heat basketball team, we would 
seriously consider remaining. . .for the subsequent season.”129 
Interestingly, although the Heat refused to exercise its option, it is not 
clear that it ever considered leaving Miami.  Instead, the team continued to 
negotiate for a revised agreement with Leisure Management International 
(LMI), the facility operator.  Although the team was able to come to an 
agreement with LMI that it felt was more favorable, the Authority was not 
comfortable with the terms of the revised agreement and directed the team to 
vacate the arena.130  The team then sued to force the Authority to get a court to 
declare that it had to consent to the revised agreement. 
Although this case did not focus on using specific performance to force a 
team to stay in an arena, the court did analyze specific performance as the 
team asked it to force the Authority to be held to the revised agreement.  The 
Authority argued that the agreement was merely a personal service contract 
and so not subject to specific performance. The court responded that the 
agreement was a typical lease agreement “and such an agreement may be 
subject to specific performance. . .if it appears from the agreement that the  
rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the terms and conditions of 
                                                 
128. Florida Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd., v. Miami Sports and Exhibition Authority, 939 F.Supp. 
855, 857 (S.D. Fla. 1996). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 858. 
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the contract and the actions to be taken by the parties are clear, definite and 
certain.”131 
The Authority also argued that the nature of the possible harm the team 
would face by not being allowed to play in the arena was entirely economic 
and subject to specific calculation.  However, the court disagreed, finding that 
there was “overwhelming evidence” that showed that the Panthers’ entire 
success rests “on the interest and loyalty of the fans” and if the team were 
forced to vacate, the “potential harm to the Panthers is incalculable and 
extends beyond the financial injury.”132  As the court explained, the team 
could lose “home game advantage,” “goodwill among its fans,” and its 
relationship with the NHL could also be harmed.133  The court also found that 
the Authority’s disapproval would cause its own economic harm as “the 
Panthers Lease Amendment provides economic benefits to the public.”134  
Therefore, the court enjoined the Authority from forcing the team to vacate 
and forced the Authority to specifically perform its obligations under the lease 
agreement. 
 F. Minnesota Twins (2002) 
In 2001, as rumors of Major League Baseball’s efforts to contract two 
financially troubled teams began to circulate, the Metropolitan Sports 
Facilities Commission asked a Minnesota court to enter a declaratory 
judgment forcing the Minnesota Twins to specifically perform their obligation 
to play the 2002 season in the Metrodome, an obligation they had exercised 
under their lease option a few months earlier.135 
In reviewing the trial court’s decision granting the Commission 
declaratory relief, the appellate court repeatedly noted that the “major benefit” 
to the Commission and the entire lease agreement between the parties was 
“based on the Twins promise to play their 2002 season in the Metrodome.”136  
With this as the foundation for its analysis of the lease agreement, the 
appellate court agreed with the trial court and its discussion of the harm that 
the city would face if the Twins were allowed to play somewhere else during 
the lease term, 
                                                 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 860. 
133. Id.   
134. Id. 
135. Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission v. Minnesota Twins Partnership, 638 N.W.2d 
214 (Ct. App. Minn. 2002). 
136. Id. at 219 & 221. 
ANDERSON.MILLER.211 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/28/2011  2:35 PM 
146 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPORT [Vol. 21:1 
the commission, the state, citizens, and fans would suffer irreparable 
harm if the Twins failed to play their 2002 home games at the 
Metrodome. The court (1) cited the role of baseball as a tradition and 
as a national pastime, the history of the Twins in Minnesota for some 
40 years, including two World Series championships, the role of 
Twins legends who have bettered the community by their volunteer 
work with children, and the availability of Twins games as affordable 
family entertainment; (2) noted that private buildings had been 
condemned to build the Metrodome; (3) found that the welfare, 
recreation, prestige, prosperity, trade, and commerce of the people of 
the community are at stake; and (4) ruled that the vital public trust 
outweighs any private interest.137 
The lease agreement itself said that 
If the Team ceases to play its games at the Stadium as required by 
section 2.3. . .or if the Team ceases to play major league professional 
baseball games for any reason, the Team shall have breached this 
agreement and will be liable for such remedies as may be available to 
the commission at law or in equity, including, but not limited to 
injunctive relief and orders for specific performance requiring the 
Team to play its Home Games at the Stadium during the Term 
hereof.138 
The appellate court found that although “a party does not have an automatic 
right to specific performance as a remedy for breach of a contract,”139 this 
language provided for the remedy of specific performance to force the team to 
play its home games in the Metrodome.140   
 The court also addressed the typical concern found with the specific 
performance as a remedy; that enforcement of this remedy would create a 
burden on the judiciary as it would have to continue to supervise the 
relationship between the parties.  The court found that this potential burden 
would not defeat the remedy of specific performance because this remedy 
simply “continues a close, long-term relationship,” and therefore, the 
administrative burden on the court would not be significant.141 
In the end, because the loss of the Twins would result in a form of 
intangible loss to the public, a loss that could not be properly calculated by a 
                                                 
137. Id. at 221-222. 
138. Id. at 226, citing Section 18.3 of the use agreement (emphasis modified). 
139. Id. at 227. 
140. Id. at 226. 
141. Id. at 229. 
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damage award, and because the burden on the court would be minimal, the 
appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and upheld the specific 
performance award.142  As a result, MLB was enjoined from attempting to 
contract the Twins, for at least one season, and the Twins relationship with the 
city of Minneapolis has continued. 
 G.   Specific Performance in Professional Sports Leases 
As these cases demonstrate, teams and communities have attempted to 
invoke specific performance as a remedy in order to get the other party to their 
lease agreement to fulfill their end of the bargain.  The courts that have 
analyzed this remedy agree that specific performance could be a viable remedy 
for a breach of a professional sports lease.  As the Panthers’ and Twins’ 
litigation demonstrated, clear specific performance provisions that provide 
definite obligations for the parties involved will likely be looked upon more 
favorably.  The courts recognize the value that the presence of a professional 
sports team can bring to a community.  They also agree that the community 
should have some recourse allowing it to reap the benefits of its bargains and 
commitment to the team, because if the team leaves the city will be irreparably 
harmed. 
Unfortunately, everything is not so clear.  Initially, as the court explained 
in the Angels’ case, it would seem obvious that the team must actually breach 
the lease agreement before the community can invoke a specific performance 
clause.  But, this is not so clear as the Twins’ court enforced a specific 
performance remedy against a team that had not yet breached its agreement 
because it had already executed its option to remain in the city for the next 
year.  In addition, while some courts (like the court in the Jazz case) realize the 
potential problems that can be created when a court enforces a specific 
performance provision that necessarily impacts the entire league, others do not 
seem to care and are willing to impose this remedy on the entire league and its 
overall schedule (as happened in the Jets case). 
VI. THE PROBLEM WITH SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE CLAUSES 
In addition to the inconsistent treatment of specific performance 
provisions within professional sports leases by the courts, there are many other 
problems with the use of the remedy of specific performance to force a team to 
stay in a community. 
                                                 
142. Id. at 224-225 & 230. 
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Initially, due to the inconsistent court decisions, many teams will calculate 
the risk that the court will enforce the specific performance provision against 
the possible rewards they may receive if they breach the agreement. These 
rewards could be in the form of better lease terms or benefits, or even a better 
deal from another community.  In addition, if a team knows that the provision 
will not be enforced because the court will instead look to an award of 
damages, the team would be making a rational business decision by evaluating 
the cost of damages that might be imposed for a breach, against the potential 
benefits the team will realize if it is no longer subject to the lease 
agreement.143 
If this scenario seems far-fetched, the possibility that a specific 
performance provision may actually be enforced could be even more of a 
problem.  Keep in mind that if a court enforced a specific performance remedy 
enjoining a team from relocating this remedy affects every team within that 
particular league.  And even though some courts do not seem to find this 
problematic, “[a]n injunction commanding the team and, necessarily, all other 
teams to play out the. . .season in”144 a particular arena can have serious 
consequences.  This specific result is what happened in the litigation involving 
the Jets and the Twins.145  Each court specifically enjoined the particular 
league, the NFL and MLB respectively, from scheduling games to be played at 
locations with the Jets and Twins outside of Shea Stadium and the Metrodome.  
These decisions necessarily impact the league, every other team, and every 
other community where a team is located.  This result “frustrates the need for 
national uniformity in regulation of national professional sports leagues,”146 
and “[j]udicially compelling specific performance of a long-term sports 
playing facility lease, particularly if multiple league franchises have 
corresponding court-ordered obligations, may severely inhibit a league’s 
ability to produce and market its product in a desirable and efficient manner 
consistent with consumers’ best interests.”147 
This is not the only problem.  As explained throughout this chapter, when 
a community sues in order to force a team to specifically perform its 
obligations, the community will often rely on the extensive benefits that are 
associated with the presence of a team within that community.  However, one 
                                                 
143. Bradley Stein, How the Home Team Can Keep From Getting Sacked” A City’s Best Defense 
to Franchise Free Agency in Professional Football, 5 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 21 (2003). 
144. Burton & Mitten, supra note 107, at 816. 
145. City of New York, 394 N.Y.S.2d 805; Metropolitan Sports Facilities Commission, 638 
N.W.2d at 230. 
146. Burton & Mitten, supra note 107, at 834. 
147. Id. at 842. 
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has to assume that the relationship between the team and the community is 
negatively impacted by this type of legal battle. 
Initially, even if a team is forced to stay, season ticket holders and other 
fans “could understandably refuse to support a lame duck team during its final 
season[s],”148 which could then become a season “earmarked by public scorn 
and disaffection with the team and its ownership.”149  In addition, in situations 
like that in Seattle, where a team is attempting to breach a lease that does not 
have a long term left, it would make sense for the team to cut its costs in 
“advertising and special events, as well as such things as high quality players, 
coaches and managers.”150  In these situations, with hurt feelings and public 
displays of anger and disappointment on both sides, it is hard to understand 
how a court could justify its decision to enforce a specific performance 
provision by pointing to the benefits the team brings to the city. 
Still, there is no debate that cities have invested millions of dollars in 
taxpayer funds in order to provide facilities for professional sports franchises. 
Cities believe in these investments and continue to make them due to the 
incredible benefits they perceive from the presence of a professional sports 
team within their community.  Perhaps there is no better evidence of this belief 
than what has happened in many communities that have lost teams - soon after 
this loss, they end up committing even more public dollars in order to entice a 
new team to their facility.  As one commentator remarked “many major cities 
have lost their professional franchises, often for failure to update their 
facilities, only to go back to the leagues later with promises to provide the 
financing - at a higher cost, of course - for new facilities in order to acquire a 
new franchise.”151 
Still, while communities clearly invest significant tax dollars in facilities 
for professional teams, there is often a point where they are no longer willing 
to make this commitment.  This is what eventually occurred in Seattle.  While 
the city was willing to commit $74 million to renovate Key Arena in an effort 
to keep the Sonics in Seattle for the foreseeable future, when new owners 
sought further public funding for a new arena, the city balked at the request.  
Unfortunately, history shows that communities that do not commit further 
resources to their team often lose the team, only to pay more money in order to 
                                                 
148. Id. at 832. 
149. Id.  
150. Id. at 833. 
151. Dean Bonham & Don Hinchey, Sonics Offer a Lesson for Cities with Major League 
Franchises, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 10, 2008. 
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entice a new team to the city in the future.  Cleveland and Houston provide 
perfect examples of this situation. 
In the early 1990s, the Cleveland Browns were looking for a new or 
renovated stadium to replace Municipal Stadium, a facility built originally for 
track and field events almost sixty years earlier.  The city refused to assist in 
paying for a new stadium and instead put together a deal to renovate the 
stadium with $125 million in public funding through bond sales and tax 
increases.152  The Browns responded by attempting to move to Baltimore.  The 
Browns were initially enjoined from moving, as the court agreed that they 
would be violation of the promise within their lease to play their home games 
in the stadium.153  However, they eventually left for Baltimore, becoming the 
Ravens, for a favorable lease deal and a new stadium in Camden Yards (M&T 
Bank Stadium) built with some $230 million in public dollars.154 
Of course, the city of Cleveland still wanted to have an NFL team, and in 
1998 the NFL awarded Cleveland an expansion franchise.  As part of the 
agreement with the NFL, the city agreed to build a new stadium at a cost of 
some $241 million in public dollars.155  In the end, the only losers in this 
situation are the taxpayers in Cleveland who ended up paying almost double 
the initial amount offered before the franchise relocated and spent three years 
without the benefits associated with the presence of an NFL team in 
Cleveland. 
A similar situation happened in Houston, Texas.  In the mid-1990s the 
team was looking for a new football only stadium to replace the Astrodome, 
which the team had found to be unsuitable to allow it to compete in the NFL.  
The team agreed to contribute $65-85 million to the construction of a possible 
$250 million new facility, but local leaders in Houston could not agree and a 
proposal never materialized.156  In response, the team began looking to other 
cities, and in 1995 it announced that it would move to Nashville, Tennessee 
after playing in Houston since the 1960s.  The city of Nashville offered a 
brand new facility (now LP Field), that was financed entirely by 
approximately $290 million in public dollars.157  After the team left in 1999, 
the city of Houston searched for a replacement and soon committed almost 
                                                 
152. Jon Morgan, When 70,000 Fans Just Aren’t Enough Cleveland: Problem for the Browns is 
the Stadium, Not the Support, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 4, 1995. 
153. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., No. 297833 (C.P. Cuyahoga, Nov. 24, 
1995). 
154. NSLI, supra note 2. 
155. Id. 
156. Jeff Legwold, The House that Bud Built, THE TENNESSEAN, May 19, 2002, at C1. 
157. NSLI, supra note 2. 
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$240 million toward Reliant Stadium, the home of the new Houston Texans 
beginning in 2002.158 
The most recent NBA example of this phenomenon involved Charlotte, 
North Carolina.  By 2000, the Charlotte Hornets began to ask the city of 
Charlotte for a new arena.159  At the time, the team played in the Charlotte 
Coliseum, and although they had some of the highest attendance figures in the 
NBA, the arena was designed before luxury suites were standard in NBA 
arenas and only contained twelve suites.160  Team owners complained that they 
were unable to generate the revenue they needed to continue to remain 
competitive in the NBA, and that they were losing $15-20 million each year.161  
For the next two years the team and city put forth several proposals for a new 
arena.  Eventually voters rejected a $342 million package to build a new arena 
for the team.162 By 2002, the Hornets’ owners had signed a memorandum of 
understanding with the city of New Orleans163 to relocate to New Orleans for 
the 2002-2003 season.  The city of New Orleans pledged to provide at least 
$18.5 million to renovate an existing arena for the team.164 
Shortly after the Hornets announced that they would be relocating to New 
Orleans, former Boston Celtics greats Larry Bird and M.L. Carr sent an 
inquiry to NBA Commissioner David Stern about the possibility of bringing 
an expansion franchise to Charlotte.165 After the NBA made clear that it would 
not grant a new franchise to the city unless a new arena was built, city leaders 
put together a $265 million plan to build what became Time Warner Cable 
Arena.166 The league approved the expansion Charlotte Bobcats in 2004, and 
the team initially played the 2004-2005 season in the old Charlotte Coliseum 
before moving in to the new arena. 
The Charlotte, Cleveland and Houston situations are not unique.  Virtually 
every city in the United States that has lost a professional sports team from 
                                                 
158. Id., National Football League: Appendix B. 
159. NSLI, supra note 7. 
160. Id. 
161. Associated Press, Bird, Carr Thinking Pro Hoops in Charlotte?, USA TODAY, May 23, 
2002. 
162. NSLI, Facility Update Charts: National Basketball Association: Appendix 3.2, SPORTS 
FACILITY REPORTS, Vol. 2, Number 2 (Fall 2001), http://law.marquette.edu/s3/site/ 
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163. Of course, New Orleans lost the Jazz in 1979.  See HMC Management Corp., 375 So.2d 
700. 
164. NSLI, supra note 8. 
165. Id. 
166. Laura Williams-Tracy, Arena Bounces Back, CHARLOTTE BUS. J., Aug. 9, 2002. 
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any of the major sports leagues, has then fought to come up with a new plan to 
entice a team to relocate back to the city, or to entice the league to award it an 
expansion franchise.  Cities who balk at what they characterize as exorbitant 
and exploitive tactics by teams who ask for new or renovated facilities, will 
independently develop new subsidization plans committing even more tax 
dollars to a new or renovated facility a few, if not several years later. The real 
question becomes, “[w]hy didn’t they just pony up the money for a new 
stadium or arena in the first place?”167 
The answer to this question may be that the community did not have the 
political will to move forward earlier, and a few years later the climate has 
changed.  Perhaps the community finally realized the benefits it lost, both 
economic and intangible, when the team moved.  Or perhaps the community 
was willing to start over after stepping away from the poisoned relationship it 
had with past owners or ownership groups. 
Regardless of the reasons, the reality is clear.  Communities continue to 
fight with teams and try to rebuff their requests and proposals for increased 
public support for new or renovated facilities.  At the same time, many 
communities continue to tout the economic benefits that they can reap from 
the presence of a major league franchise.  Therefore, in an effort to keep the 
team without paying additional subsidies in order to continue to realize these 
benefits, cities like New Orleans, New York, Minnesota and Seattle, ask the 
courts to specifically enforce their agreements with the teams in order to 
ensure that those teams cannot move.  When the teams relocate, a community 
that may have initially balked at increased public funding will all too often put 
forth even more funding a few years later to create a relationship with a new 
team. 
VII. A BETTER DEAL? 
Communities place incredible value on the presence of a major league 
team and pay for this value with large amounts of public subsidization.  As a 
result, there must be a way for them to protect themselves from the worst case 
scenario when the team leaves a city that clearly wants the team to stay.  As 
previously shown, specific performance provisions do not appear to be the 
answer due to their inconsistent treatment by the courts and due to their 
nebulous value even if enforced.  However, as the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized, “local governments ought to be able 
                                                 
167. Bonham & Hinchey, supra note 151. 
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to protect their investment through the leases they negotiate with the terms for 
the use of their stadia.”168 
The best answer for a city may be to include well-drafted retention clauses 
within the lease agreement with the team.  In general terms, since the early 
1990s these clauses have included “lease provisions that provide remedies that 
allow one party (usually the facility owner [the community]) to protect its 
position relative to the sports facility lease agreement in the event that the 
other party seeks to breach that agreement.”169  These provisions can be very 
powerful because they force the party attempting to breach the lease by 
relocating to face serious and expensive consequences if they follow through 
with their attempt. 
1. Non-relocation Clauses 
The first, and perhaps most commonly used type of retention provision is 
a non-relocation clause.  These clauses have only been seen in major league 
leases over the past two decades, however, since the majority of facilities 
within the four major leagues have been built in the past 20 years, the presence 
of these types of clauses has been increasing. 
Similar to a home team clause, a non-relocation clause contains a team’s 
contractual promise that it will play its home games at a particular facility for 
the duration of the lease agreement, however, in a non-relocation clause this 
promise is put in the negative.  In other words, a team is not merely promising 
that it “will” play in the facility.  Instead, on top of this promise it also 
promises that it will not “relocate” to another facility or community during the 
duration of the agreement. 
The initial versions of these types of clauses were very short.  For 
instance, the Baltimore Ravens lease for M&T Bank Stadium contains a 
provision stating that, 
No Relocation: Maintenance of Franchise: During the Term, the Team 
will not relocate nor, permit any of its home games, during the regular 
season or otherwise, to be played in any location other than the 
Football Stadium. . .170 
The agreement between the Colorado Rockies and the Denver 
Metropolitan Major League Baseball Stadium District for Coors Field contains 
                                                 
168. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984). 
169. MILLER & ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 337. 
170. Id. at 357-58, citing Amended and Restated Agreement by and between Maryland Stadium 
Authority and Baltimore Ravens Limited Partnership. 
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a similar provision in Article XIII entitled Relocation of Team. The clause is 
followed by a provision that also allows the team to pursue specific 
performance remedies for various sections of the agreement. 
Except during any period of untenantability pursuant to Article IX, 
temporary taking pursuant to Section 16.3 or deferral of the 
Commencement Date pursuant to Section 3.2, the Partnership shall 
not apply to the National League for approval to allow the Team to 
play any Major League Baseball Game anywhere other than in the 
Stadium during the Term. 
The Partnership recognizes that the Stadium is being constructed, the 
sales tax was imposed, and the bonds were issued solely to bring the 
Team and the franchise to the District, and agrees that in the event of 
a violation of this Article XIII, the District shall, without posting any 
bond, be entitled to seek and obtain an injunction from the District 
Court of the City and County of Denver, Colorado or any other court 
of competent jurisdiction, to enjoin any violation of this Article 
XIII.171 
The Florida Panthers’ lease for the Bank Atlantic Center contains similar 
language to the Rockies’ lease by including a “negative pledge” in the 
agreement in which “the Team hereby pledges to the County and the Operator 
not to play any of the Team’s Home Games at any location other than the 
Facility.”172 The lease also contains specific performance language that 
references the team’s covenants to the community.173 
In many current major league agreements, non-relocation provisions have 
become much more detailed and comprehensive.  For example, the Detroit 
Lions’ lease agreement for Ford Field requires the team to commit to not 
applying to the NFL to play regular or post-season games at a location other 
than Ford Field and also explicitly prohibits the team from filing a formal 
application to the NFL to move the team or from entering into any form of 
contract or agreement that would transfer the team to a location other than 
                                                 
171 Amended and Restated Lease and Management Agreement by and between Denver 
Metropolitan Major League Baseball Stadium District and Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 
March 30, 1995, at 79. 
172 Broward County Civic Arena License Agreement by and among Broward County, Florida and 
Florida Panthers Hockey Club, Ltd. And Arena Operating Company, dated as of May 1996, at 39-40. 
173 Id. 
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Ford Field without prior written consent from the City of Detroit Downtown 
Development Authority.174 
The Pittsburgh Steelers’ lease agreement for Heinz Field goes beyond the 
Lions’ deal by imposing an additional requirement.  The Steelers’ deal 
requires that the team “maintain their business offices, headquarters, training 
facilities and camps and football related enterprises in the Commonwealth.”175 
Ironically, perhaps one of the best examples of this approach is found in 
the city that ended up the beneficiary of the Seattle SuperSonics move.  The 
License Agreement between the city of Oklahoma City and PBC contains an 
entire article devoted to non-relocation.  The provision is called a “Covenant 
to Play” and includes both a home team provision, and a non-relocation 
provision. 
The initial home team provision is contained in section 20.1.1, “Covenant 
to Play in Arena.  Subject to the provisions hereof. . . the Team hereby 
covenants and agrees to play, all of its Home Games in the 
Arena. . .throughout the License Term. . .”176  Standing alone, this provision 
would be no different than any of the other home team type clauses discussed 
earlier.  However, this provision is coupled with an extensive non-relocation 
clause as well. 
The non-relocation clause begins with a section that lists “Prohibited 
Actions.” Under this clause, the team is prohibited from applying for or 
seeking approval from the NBA “for the relocation of the Team outside of the 
boundaries of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.”177  This is a much more specific 
and definite provision than the mere covenant to play games at the arena as it 
makes clear the team is warranting that it will not even bring up possible 
relocation with the league. 
Perhaps unique to this agreement, and as alluded to earlier in the letter sent 
from PBC to the mayor of Oklahoma City during the Seattle litigation, this 
provision also contains a clause related to “Economic Viability.”  Under this 
provision the team is given limited rights to terminate the agreement during its 
sixth, ninth and twelfth years if certain economic benchmarks are not 
reached.178  As discussed earlier, during the litigation with the city of Seattle 
                                                 
174. Concession and Management Agreement by and Between City of Detroit Downtown 
Development Authority and the Detroit Lions, Inc. and Agreed to and Approved by Detroit/Wayne 
County Stadium Authority, 1998, at 85-86. 
175. Lease Agreement by and between Sports & Exhibition Authority of Pittsburgh and 
Allegheny County and PSSI Stadium Corp., dated as of June 20, 2000, at 32. 
176. Arena Use License Agreement, supra note 79, at 63. 
177. Id. at 64, §20.2.1. 
178. Id. §20.4, at 66. 
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the team argued that it had lost many millions of dollars each year, because of 
this one could presume that it wanted Oklahoma City to include these 
provisions in order to provide the team with a way to get out of the lease if 
those types of losses were repeated. 
Related to this economic viability clause is the other non-relocation clause 
related to “Third Party Negotiations.”  Under this clause, if the economic 
benchmarks are not met, then the city, authority, or operator, will default on 
their obligations under the lease, and the team is allowed to begin negotiations 
with third parties to relocate.179 
If the team breaches the non-relocation clause or covenant to play in the 
arena, then it will have committed a “Non-Relocation Default.”180  The city 
may seek declaratory or injunctive relief and may terminate the lease 
altogether.181  Interestingly, in explaining why the city would be allowed to 
seek injunctive relief, the clause includes many of the same explanations that 
communities have put forth in the litigation discussed in this chapter as it 
provides that 
The Team acknowledges and agrees that: 
(a) In reliance on the Team’s commitments to play its Home Games in 
the Arena. . .the City is developing and constructing the Arena 
Upgrades at a cost to the taxpayers. . .in excess of $95 million; 
(b) But for the Team’s commitment to play its Home Games in the 
Arena. . .the City and Authority would not have gone forward with 
developing and constructing the NBA Improvements as part of the 
Arena Upgrades or constructing the Practice Facility. . .; 
(c) Having the team play its Home Games in the Arena. . .provides a 
unique value to the City and the Authority, not only in terms of 
generating funds to operate the Arena, but also in terms of generating 
new jobs, additional revenue sources and economic development and 
increased tourism for the City; 
(d) The City and Authority would suffer immediate and irreparable 
harm if a Non-Relocation Default were to occur; and 
(e) Monetary damages may not adequately compensate the City and 
the Authority for the damage they would incur if a Non-Relocation 
Default were to occur.182 
                                                 
179. Id. §20.2.2, at 64. 
180. Id. §20.3.1, at 65. 
181. Id. §20.3.2, at 65. 
182. Id. §20.3.3, at 65-66. 
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Nowhere in this provision is there any discussion of a specific performance 
type remedy.  However, this language mirrors the arguments made by 
communities in all of the litigation involving the potential relocation of a 
professional team.  In addition, it specifically acknowledges the inadequacy of 
damages and the irreparable harm that the city would face if the team 
relocates. 
Overall, a non-relocation clause can provide a higher level of protection 
for a community as it reinforces the guarantees that the team has made to 
fulfill its commitments under the lease.  Teams faced with these types of 
clauses no longer need to merely focus on whether a court will impose a 
specific performance remedy, instead, they have now agreed that they will not 
even discuss the possibility of relocation with the league or another 
community.  This is a theoretically stronger legal commitment from a team 
and all communities negotiating with major league franchises should consider 
demanding it in future lease agreements. 
Unfortunately, few cases have tested the actual enforceability of these 
types of clauses.  The decisions that can be found have focused on bankruptcy 
issues related to the purchase of a team.  Within a bankruptcy proceeding, 
these types of provisions often will not have their intended effect as the 
franchise seeking bankruptcy protection may be able to reject the sports 
facility agreement.183 However, the few reported cases have enjoined the 
breaching party (usually the team or team owners) from breaching the non-
relocation covenant found in the lease agreement.  This may be further 
evidence of the strength of these provisions as teams who have agreed to 
leases with these types of provisions have not often attempted to relocate, 
perhaps showing that they to understand the power of this type of 
commitment. 
2. Liquidated Damages Clauses 
Another important retention provision is a liquidated damages clause.  In 
general terms these types of clauses “provide the facility owner with at least 
some form of monetary relief if the team has decided to no longer play at the 
facility during the term of the lease agreement.”184  Beyond damages that a 
court might grant to a community when a team breaches the lease, a liquidated 
                                                 
183. See for example, In re: Pittsburgh Sports Associates Holding Company, et. al., 1999 Bankr. 
LEXIS 1870 (U.S. Bank. Ct. W.D. Penn. 1999).  See also Ralph Anzivino, Reorganization of the 
Professional Sports Franchise, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 41 (2001).  
184. MILLER & ANDERSON, supra note 100, at 363. 
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damages clause can set the recovery amount at such a high level that the team 
will never consider relocating and incurring such high costs. 
A basic example of this type of provision was contained in the Charlotte 
Hornets’ agreement at the Charlotte Coliseum.  This clause provided that if the 
team “fails or refuses to play its Home Games in the Coliseum. . .In lieu of 
specific performance,. . .[the team] shall pay. . .as liquidated damages the sum 
of $3 million for each Basketball Season or portion thereof in which Team 
Home Games are not played in the Coliseum as required. . .”185  Although $3 
million may not seem like much of a penalty, for teams claiming losses of 
$15-20 million, additional million dollar losses would still be a deterrent to 
breaching the lease. The challenge in trying to retain teams can be seen in the 
fact that the Hornets still relocated despite this liquidated damages provision, 
proving that significant financial amounts need to be sought in order to best 
protect a community’s interests. 
The Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball Playing Agreement for the 
Target Center contains a similar provision with a much higher liquidated 
damages amount.  Under Section 7.03 “Remedies of MCDA,” the team could 
be liable for liquidated damages in the amount of “Sixty Million 
($60,000,000.00) Dollars reduced by Three Million ($3,000,000.00) Dollars 
for each of the first ten (10) complete Arena Years during which Team Games 
are played in the Arena. . .and Thirty Million Dollars ($30,000,000) 
throughout the remaining Term of Team Use.”186  Clearly, a provision that 
could cause the team to pay these amounts in damages would have a chilling 
effect on any attempt to relocate. 
Overall, liquidated damages can accomplish two goals.  Initially, they 
provide the community with a tangible amount of recovery in the unlikely 
situation when a team actually relocates.  More importantly, especially when 
set at high amounts, these clauses make teams avoid results that might lead to 
making these payments and instead may encourage them to work with the 
community instead of looking to leave.187  Of course, the challenge 
community leaders face is getting owners to agree to these amounts during the 
initial deal-making process as teams often possess a great deal of leverage and 
seek to minimize the presence or potential effect of these clauses. 
                                                 
185. Id. at 363-364, citing Revised Basketball Agreement, among the Auditorium-Coliseum-
Convention Center Authority, George Shinn, and Charlotte NBA Limited Partnership, Dec. 16, 1991. 
186. Basketball Playing Agreement by and between Minnesota Timberwolves Basketball 
Limited Partnership and Minneapolis Community Development Agency, dated as of Mar. 1, 1995, at 
23. 
187. See for example, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 406 B.R. 30. 
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Similar to non-relocation clauses there has been little litigation involving a 
relocating team’s attempt to avoid a payment owed under a liquidated 
damages provision.  The cases that can be found again focus on bankruptcy 
claims, and therefore, involve situations where the team may be able to reject 
the clause altogether. 
3. Combination Clauses 
Perhaps the strongest form of protection for a city is a lease that contains 
both a non-relocation and liquidated damages clause. 
One of the earliest examples of this approach is the 1997 lease agreement 
between the Nashville Predators and the Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville and Davidson County for the use of the arena now known as 
Bridgestone Arena. The deal requires the team to play all playoff and 
championship home games at the facility.188 The agreement also requires the 
team to play its other home games at the facility but interestingly allowed the 
team to play two such games at facilities other than the arena.189 If the team 
violates this provision, the Authority has thirty days to provide written notice 
to the team to cure the failure.190 If the team fails to cure, the authority can 
terminate the damages and pursue a variety of remedies including liquidated 
damages.191 The liquidated damages amounts start at $30 million for the first 
year of the deal and were reduced by $1 million for each year of the deal.192 
The Arena Agreement between the city of Charlotte (another NBA 
community that recently suffered from the relocation of its team, only to be 
given an expansion team soon thereafter) and the Charlotte Bobcats contains 
an extensive non-relocation provision that also contains a liquidated damages 
clause.  Perhaps because the Bobcats agreement was entered into five years 
earlier, the non-relocation provision virtually mirrors the clause found in the 
Oklahoma City lease.193 
                                                 
188. License and Use Agreement by and between the Sports Authority of the Metropolitan 
Government of Nashville and Davidson County and Nashville Hockey Club Limited Partnership, 
dated as of June 25, 1997, §8.1 at 20. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. §27.1(c) at 43 
191. Id. §27.2 at 43-44 
192. Id. at 6-7. 
193. Of additional interest, the provision also allows for a remedy of specific performance in the 
event of a relocation default.  Arena Agreement among the City of Charlotte, the Auditorium-
Coliseum-Convention Center Authority, RLJ Basketball, LLC and RLJ Arena Operations, LLC, 
January 13, 2003, §4.4.3, at 34. 
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Initially, because the Bobcats had to play one year in the Charlotte 
Coliseum, the agreement contains a covenant to play in that facility until Time 
Warner Cable Arena was completed, and a covenant to play in the new arena 
as well.194  Although the specific “Non-Relocation” clause then contains 
similar provisions on “Prohibited Actions” and “Third Party Negotiations” it 
also contains two additional interesting clauses.  §4.3.1 “Relocation of Team,” 
expands the prohibition on relocation to include a prohibition from the team 
transferring, assigning or surrendering its NBA membership resulting in it not 
playing in the Coliseum and arena or not playing in the NBA at all.195  In 
addition, §4.3.5 “Non-Relocation Guaranty” provides that a group of owners, 
making up 50% of the equity of the team, must execute Owner Guaranty’s 
warranting individually that the team will not relocate.196  These two 
additional provisions provide specific and powerful commitments from the 
team to further dissuade it from considering relocation. 
The “Remedies for Non-Relocation Default” provision also mirrors that 
found in the Oklahoma City lease, except that an additional remedy of 
liquidated damages is included.  The liquidated damages provision provides 
that in situations where the city is unable to obtain injunctive relief it may 
recover liquidated damages on a scale starting at $200,000,000 if the breach 
occurs before June 30, 2010, and declining to $7,000,000 by 2030.197  The 
lease also explains that these amounts were “negotiated in an attempt to make 
a good faith effort in quantifying the amount of damages due to a Non-
Relocation Default despite the difficulty in making such a determination.”198 
Perhaps the strongest example can be found in the Non-Relocation 
Agreement between Bexar County and the San Antonio Spurs.  This 28-page 
agreement contains similar provisions to those found within the non-relocation 
clause that is part of the Bobcats lease.199  The Spurs’ agreement contains: 
• “Covenant to Play,”200 
                                                 
194. Id. §4.1, at 30-31. 
195. Id. at 31. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. §4.4.4, at 34-35. 
198. Id. at 35. 
199. The Non-Relocation Agreement is part of an overall package of agreements that set out the 
details of the relationship between the Spurs and the community.  This package includes a Coliseum 
Agreement, Community Arena Development Agreement, Community Arena Spurs Guaranty 
Agreement, License Agreement and Operating Agreement. 
200. Bexar County Community Arena Non-Relocation Agreement by and between Bexar 
County, Texas and San Antonio Spurs, L.L.C., d.b.a. San Antonio Spurs Basketball Team, Aug. 22, 
2000, Article 2, at 2-3. 
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• “Non-Relocation” provision,201 
• provision detailing “Defaults and Remedies,”202 and, 
• “Liquidated Damages” clause that starts at $250,000,000 and 
declines to $106,000,000 over the term of the lease.203 
The agreement also contains a dispute resolution provision calling for 
mediation of disputes as a condition precedent to legal proceedings.204  
Finally, the agreement allows for either party to seek specific performance to 
enforce any of the promises made by the other party within the Non-
Relocation agreement.205 
These combination provisions can provide a city with the best protection 
from the possibility of the team leaving.  Under a lease with these provisions 
the team will (1) commit to play in the facility for the term of the lease, (2) 
commit to not initiate any plans to relocate, and (3) subject itself to court 
proceedings and incredibly high levels of possible liquidated damages if it 
ever does actually relocate (damages that can be set at declining rates to match 
the amount remaining in the debt service or other payments that will reimburse 
the community for its investment in the facility).  Every community 
negotiating a lease agreement with a major league franchise should strongly 
consider attempting to follow the aforementioned examples and negotiate for 
these types of combination provisions in future lease agreements. 
Unfortunately, the challenge that communities face in retaining major 
league franchises can be seen during recent events involving the Phoenix 
Coyotes and the City of Glendale, Arizona. The lease agreement between the 
team and the city contains combination provisions that seemingly offered a 
great deal of protection for Glendale. The deal stated that the team covenanted 
to play thirty years at Jobing.com Arena and a default would occur if the team 
took any action to play games at another facility, entered into any contract or 
agreement to play at another facility, requested permission from the NHL to 
play home games at any other facility and even allowed the city to pursue 
remedies if the team took an action that could be considered an anticipatory 
breach of the covenant.206 The agreement goes on to include a specific 
                                                 
201. Id. Article 3, at 3-4. 
202. Id. Article 4, at 4-9. 
203. Id. §4.4, at 6-7. 
204. Id. Article 5, at 9-10. 
205. Id. §4.3, at 6. 
206. Arena Management, Use and Lease Agreement by and among City of Glendale, Arena 
Management Group, LLC, Coyotes Hockey, LLC, Glendale-101 Development, LLC and Coyote 
Center Development, LLC, dated as of Nov. 29, 2001, at 72. 
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performance clause backstopped by a liquidated damages clause determined 
by a formula that involved amounts starting at approximately $794 million 
minus revenues received by the city divided by the number of years remaining 
on the deal at the time of the default.207 Despite these protections, the city has 
endured several threatened relocation attempts because of the team’s 
bankruptcy in 2009.208 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In today’s economy communities are faced with a difficult choice.  On the 
one hand, any use of tax dollars to support a major team, or to build or 
renovate a facility in order to entice a major league team to relocate to a 
community, will be viewed negatively by many voters.  However, community 
leaders often believe the presence of a major league franchise can bring many 
tangible and intangible benefits that could potentially make for a worthwhile 
investment of any tax dollars used to subsidize the franchise’s presence within 
the community. 
It is because of these tangible and intangible benefits that communities 
must rethink their processes and attempt to craft lease agreements that provide 
them with stronger protection against a team’s efforts to relocate to the first 
market that comes along and offers it a better deal.  The past reliance on 
simple specific performance provisions appears to be misplaced and lease 
agreements must now be strengthened with detailed non-relocation and 
liquidated damages clauses in order to provide strong protection for the 
community’s investment.   
In the end, a community must make its own decision as to whether it will 
fight to keep a team, even when it is clear that tax payers do not support 
further subsidization of the facility that the team calls home.  With proper 
lease drafting at the beginning of the relationship, a community can try to 
avoid these difficult decisions and situations, knowing that if a team attempts 
to relocate the community can turn to its lease agreement for the proper 
resolution of any dispute. 
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